How Poor is Papua New Guinea? How Rich Could it Be? by Curtin, Tim
Resource Management in Asia-Pacific 
Working Paper No. 56 
How Poor is Papua New Guinea? 
How Rich Could it Be? 
 
Tim Curtin 
Former Advisor to the PNG Department of Treasury 
 
 
The correct citation for this publication is: 
Author: Tim Curtin 
Year of Publication: 2004 
Title: How Poor is Papua New Guinea? How Rich Could it Be? 
Series: Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Working Paper No. 56 
Publisher: Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 
The Australian National University 
Place of Publication: Canberra 
ISSN – 1444-187X 
 
Resource Management in Asia-Pacific 
Working Papers 
The Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Working Paper series seeks to provide readers with 
access to current research on environmental and resource issues in the Asia-Pacific.  Working 
Papers produced by the Program aim to facilitate discussion and debate on critical resource 
management issues in the area, and to link scholars working in different disciplines and regions. 
Publication as a ‘Working Paper’ does not preclude subsequent publication in scholarly journals or 
books, indeed it may facilitate publication by providing feedback from readers to authors. 
Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program are 
presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record debate.  Authors are 
responsible for their own analysis and conclusions. 
Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200 
Tel: +61 2 6125 9978 
Fax: +61 2 6125 4896 
Email: rmap@coombs.anu.edu.au 
 
 1
How Poor is Papua New Guinea? 
How Rich Could it Be? 
 
Abstract 
Several recent commentators (notably Gibson 2003 and Chand 2004) have stated that as many as 
37 per cent of Papua New Guineans are living below the poverty line. This is based on deeply 
flawed conclusions from the 1996 household survey conducted by Gibson and Rozelle. When 
erroneous assumptions made in that survey are corrected, the Gibson-Rozelle data indicate that 
fewer than 12 per cent were subsisting at below a minimum level of dietary energy. Many 
commentators have also asserted that Papua New Guinea’s growth performance has been poor and 
getting worse, with national income growing at less than population growth. In fact since 
independence in 1975 national income per head has grown at over 3.5 per cent per annum, i.e. well 
above population growth. Thus national income per head has increased from A$374 per head in 
1974/5 to A$1035 in 2003. That means Papua New Guinea’s growth of GDP per head over this 
period has been faster than Australia’s 2.4 per cent per annum. However it remains true that Papua 
New Guineans generally are far from rich and that the economy’s growth has been slower than it 
should have been. The second part of the paper suggests that average incomes would grow much 
more rapidly if the country’s main primary resource, its forests, were developed to their full 
potential subject to both sustainability and reasonable conservation of biodiversity. Data will be 
provided showing that plantation forestry could deliver exports worth more than the country’s total 
mineral exports in 2003 from an area of only a seventh of the total under forests. Suggestions for 
necessary legal and institutional changes for this to occur conclude the paper. 
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To give short answers to the questions in my title: 
 
1. Papua New Guinea is a poor country, but not as poor as often stated. 
2. Papua New Guinea could and should be a rich country, given its enormous human and 
renewable natural resources, were it not all too often for “stupid white men” (and women) 
in international aid organizations and NGOs who have combined with its own bureaucracy 
to prevent full development of both the most important of those resources, its people and 
its forests.1 
 
How Should We Measure Poverty in Papua New Guinea? 
Papua New Guinea’s own official data on both its population and its national income have several 
defects, resulting in unreliable estimates of its national income per head: 
 
1. The population given by the 1980 census must have been an underestimate if the 2000 
census was sound, since the latter shows many more persons alive aged 20-29 than were 
alive aged 0-9 in 1980, and likewise there were more aged 35-39 in 2000 than had been 
alive aged 15-19 in 1980 (see Figures 1 and 2). Alternatively, the 1980 census was sound, 
and the 2000 census provides a seriously exaggerated estimate of the population.  
2. GDP data since 1997 are estimated by the Bank of Papua New Guinea, because the 
National Statistical Office no longer publishes measured data. Use of 1983 as the base year 
for the published estimates of “real GDP” in 2003, when 1983 was an exceptionally good 
year for the economy, is questionable, and a range of average GDP over, say, three years 
would provide a more reasonable base year. 
3. But just as it makes no sense to express Australia’s current national income per head in, 
say, 1900 or even 1983 prices, so also for Papua New Guinea, the government’s data 
stating current income at 1983 prices has little meaning. The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
uses only the previous year as the base for its indices of changes in real income per head. 
4. Gibson (1995) has shown how the published CPI exaggerates inflation since its weights 
have not been changed since 1977, and the same may be true of the sectoral deflators used 
to represent changes in 1983 prices since then. 
 
If, as suggested by the 2000 census, the 1980 census undercounted the population, then statements 
of per capita GDP at that time will be exaggerated, and produce a low estimate of growth of GDP 
per head since that time. Alternatively, if it is the 2000 census that gives an overcounted population, 
as is plausible, since the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial and Local-level Governments introduced a 
population basis for grants to the provinces from the national government, creating an incentive for 
inflating population growth (seen also in electoral rolls), then that also results in understated growth 
of per capita income.  Restating the 2000 population to secure conformity with the 1980 census 
(see Appendix), GDP per capita in 2003 rises to K2701 or A$1168 for an annualised growth rate 
from 1974/5 in PNG kina of 7.06 per cent, and in Australian dollars of 4.07 per cent per annum. 
Even on the official population figure for 2003, the rate of growth of GDP in Australian dollars 
(current prices) since 1974/5 is 3.63 per cent per annum (see Table 1).2  
                                                     
1 Filer (2004) has shown that the effect of the World Bank’s interventions in regard to forestry has been to 
prevent proper exploitation. Less well documented is the Bank’s successful opposition to expansion of 
education, whereby its insistence on user pay fees has set back attainment of universal primary schooling and 
its direct prohibitions prevented expansion of upper secondary education in the 1980s and tertiary education 
in the 1990s (see Curtin 1991). 
2 The World Bank’s “atlas method” yields per capita national income of only US$510 in Papua New Guinea 
in 2003 (Papua New Guinea at a Glance, 15 September 2004), even though any Papua New Guinean with only 
the official average income in 2003 of K2393 would have been able to exchange that for US$674 at his/her 
bank with a minimum of fuss. It is worth noting that the World Bank’s use of the US dollar for international 
income comparisons over time is unwise, given its role as an international reserve currency, whereby its 
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Recent commentators like Chand (2004) and Hughes (2004) dwell on these figures and stress that, 
at best, per capita incomes have not improved for many years, because population growth at the 
claimed inter-censal rate of 2.66 per cent per annum between 1980 and 2000 has equalled or 
exceeded annual growth in total national income and GDP. But over the whole period since 
independence, GDP per capita in Australian dollars (which was at par with Papua New Guinea’s 
currency in 1975) has increased by 3.5 per cent per annum, which is both better than implied by 
most commentators -- and better than Australia’s 2.5 per cent growth of per capita income over the 
same period -- if also certainly below both the country’s potential growth rate and the rates 
achieved in countries to the north.  
 
The Australian dollar equivalent of current price national incomes in Papua New Guinea in 2003 is 
preferred here to the government’s data using inflation adjusted GDP data because of problems 
with the inflation adjustments. Moreover, there is evidence, first, that in 1974/5, when Papua New 
Guinea had the same currency as Australia, relative prices were not out of line, and second, that 
since Papua New Guinea floated the kina in 1994, domestic prices have adjusted to Australian 
equivalents, so that the kina is no longer overvalued as it was for most of the period from 1975 to 
1994. Thus Australian dollar conversions are no longer as unrealistic as they were before 1994.  
 
Deriving average incomes from a country’s total GDP is of course only half the story, because the 
average conceals the dispersion of income around the mean and therefore provides no information 
on the degree of inequality within a country, such as the relative numbers of rich and poor and how 
rich or poor they are respectively. Gibson and Rozelle (1998) have provided the most detailed 
answers to these questions with estimates of both the proportions of the urban and rural 
population that are living in poverty and of the extent of their poverty.  
 
Their approach to measuring poverty is to attempt to value Papua New Guineans’ production for 
their own subsistence, and then to judge whether that affords an adequate or only a poverty 
standard of living. Duncan and Temu (1995: 37) had suggested that the value of subsistence 
production in the national accounts is usually underestimated, for example, at only K396 million in 
1989, and that it is likely to contribute more than half of commercial agriculture’s share of GDP. 
Gibson and Rozelle (1998: 19) support this view by indicating a value of total rural household food 
production of K1.3 billion in 1995. But that apparently large amount reduces to only K362 per 
person of Papua New Guinea’s rural population in 1995, i.e. less than one kina per person per day 
(equal to US$0.70 in 1995, so less than the US$1.00 per person per day considered by the World 
Bank to be the bare minimum for survival). Bourke has assembled some new estimates of staple 
food crop production in Papua New Guinea in 2000, arriving at a total of 4.5 million tonnes, 
yielding a per capita calorie consumption of nearly 3,000 without taking into account consumption 
of imported foods. Bourke (2004) suggests that the value of the domestic crops may be estimated 
from the amount of rice that would yield the equivalent level of calories, namely 1.19 million 
tonnes, worth K2.73 million at the wholesale price of rice in Papua New Guinea in 2000, or about 
K1.5 (about US$0.4) per person of the total population per day, and so less than the Gibson and 
Rozelle estimate for 1996.3
 
It should however be noted that such per capita income data, which average total subsistence 
production over the rural population as a whole, conceal considerable variations. Apart from some 
quite large coffee farms, like those around Goroka described by Benediktsson (2002), and the oil 
palm block holders in West New Britain that generate substantial cash incomes in addition to basic 
                                                                                                                                                           
exchange value is as much determined by the central banks of Japan and China as by the Federal Reserve. 
That is why Australian dollar comparisons may give a more reliable trend over time. 
3 Bourke’s figure could be considered an under-estimate of the value of domestic food production in Papua 
New Guinea, since it uses the wholesale rather than retail price of rice. 
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food self-sufficiency, compensation paid to landowners in the main mining project areas provides 
substantial cash income. In other areas there is little or no cash income, and especially in those areas 
dependent on sago, consumption levels in terms of protein and carbohydrates are also low. In yet 
other areas, for example in Mare (Morobe Province), incomes from inland fishing of between 
K5034 and K6965 per family are reported by Grieg-Gran and Guijt (1998). In the Tari basin of the 
Southern Highlands, Yamauchi (2000) found calorie consumption rates for men from 2300 in dry 
upland areas to 3586 in flat wetlands (and from 2100 to 2900 for women respectively). 
 
Gibson and Rozelle (1998: 41) found from the urban household surveys conducted between 1985 
and 1990 that the headcount of poverty on the “upper poverty line” (which includes non-food 
items) was 21.5 per cent, and for the “food poverty line”, 6.6 per cent. Their 1996 survey led them 
to raise these estimates by large fractions. But the derivation of their revised poverty lines is 
questionable (see below). Perhaps their most important -- and most neglected -- finding was that 
poverty thus defined was inversely related to level of education, and especially if that included post-
school diplomas or degrees, and to wage employment or having an own business, and directly 
related to unemployment and large households.  
 
The later Gibson and Rozelle estimates for 1996 were picked up by Satish Chand (2004: 1) with his 
assertion that “37 per cent of the population [of Papua New Guinea] lived below the poverty line 
where the poverty line was set at an income level of K461 per adult”. However, he was misled by 
his sources, including various World Bank reports (1999a and 1999b) that uncritically adopted the 
Gibson-Rozelle results.  
 
Those authors are noted statisticians, and taken as a whole, their survey broke new ground in 
poverty studies, but it began with a seriously flawed assumption that, when corrected, removes the 
headline findings that have been seized on so avidly by Chand amongst others. Their core 
assumption deems that all with incomes insufficient to achieve a prescribed minimum food calorie 
consumption level of 2200 calories per day are living in poverty (Gibson and Rozelle 1998: 45; 
2003: 161). But that poverty minimum of per adult equivalent daily consumption of 2200 calories is 
usually considered a normal rather than poverty level of food consumption. Even the FAO, 
notorious for exaggerating food deficits, distinguishes between “average calorie requirement” and 
“minimum calorie requirement” (Svedberg 2002: 11), with the former at between 2100 and 2220 
and the latter at between 1790 and 1880 (for various regions of the world). Using FAO minima 
would of course greatly reduce the proportion of Papua New Guineans deemed by Gibson and 
Rozelle to be living in food poverty to probably less than 12 per cent, as they showed (1998: 37) 
that even the bottom quartile (25 per cent) of households enjoyed consumption of 1955 calories 
per day per adult equivalent -- well above the FAO minima (see also World Bank 1999b: 77).4  
 
Gibson and Rozelle (1998) did not in practice measure calorie consumption, but derived it by 
calculating the minimum income needed to purchase the calorie minimum from cost estimates of 
food baskets containing the calorie minimum priced at urban levels, with the latter subject to a wide 
margin of error (see Table 2 for their base-line costing of the calorie consumption minimum). They 
then developed three different poverty lines: the upper poverty line of K461 income per adult 
equivalent including both food and non-food consumption, with 37 per cent of the population not 
achieving this; a lower poverty line, at K399 with 30 per cent not achieving it; and the food-only 
poverty line, at K302, with 14 per cent not attaining it. The first two of these poverty lines included 
larger or smaller quantities of non-food items respectively. All three lines maintained 2200 calories 
as the poverty minimum level of food consumption. 
 
One difficulty with the above estimates is that they are not always confirmed in other papers by 
Gibson based on the same survey. For example, Gibson (2000b: 408) states that “approximately 42 per 
cent (sic) of the population did not meet a target food energy requirement of 2000 (sic) calories per 
                                                     
4 See Svedberg (2002) for a detailed account of statistical flaws in the FAO’s derivations of both its minimum 
calorie consumption benchmark and its computation of proportions not attaining it. 
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person per day” -- whereas Gibson and Rozelle (1998) had stated that 37 per cent did not meet the 
2200 level. More serious is the lack of correspondence between the food consumption data set out 
in Gibson and Rozelle (1998: 49) and in Gibson (2000a: 41), again citing the same 1996 survey.  
Thus the former shows sweet potato consumption per adult equivalent of 242.7 kg a year (national 
average), and the latter shows 260 kg per person, which when converted to adult equivalents (for the 
actual proportions of the population aged more than 6 or less than 7) amounts to 289 -- over 46 kg 
more than the 1998 figure. An even bigger discrepancy applies to rice (8.4 kg and 34.4 kg per adult 
equivalent in the 1998 and 2000 versions respectively). Sweet potatoes and rice are the main sources 
of calories, so these are not trivial discrepancies, and with such divergent reporting from 
purportedly the same survey data, it is clear that not much reliance should be attached to the 
Gibson-Rozelle and Gibson conclusions on the extent of food poverty in Papua New Guinea. 
 
Another major problem with the Gibson and Rozelle survey is that it derives monetary valuations 
of its postulated minimum diet when in reality most food consumption of the majority of Papua 
New Guineans is own-produced by themselves as subsistence farmers and is therefore not priced to 
cover the costs of transport to, and sales in, urban areas (including wholesale and retail margins) 
(Gibson and Rozelle 1998: 55). Hence the stated minimum income per adult (needed to attain the 
supposed minimum diet of 2200 calories at market prices) is likely to exaggerate the cost of 
minimum subsistence levels. The basic fallacy underlying the Gibson-Rozelle analysis is their failure 
to appreciate that most rural Papua New Guineans are subsistence farmers who are free to grow as 
much as they believe they need to eat, so it is reasonable to assume they mostly succeed and that 
therefore they cannot be deemed always to be living in food poverty. 
Nevertheless, whilst clearly there is not such general poverty as to signify widespread malnutrition, 
there is evidence of localised malnutrition, particularly of children. Mueller (2000) showed that 
children in areas dependent on banana, sago, and taro were more likely to be stunted or showing 
other symptoms of malnutrition than children in areas where there was more access to imported 
cereals as well as locally grown foods like cassava and sweet potato. Muntwiler and Shelton (2000) 
cited incidence of children with moderate to severe malnutrition at Onamuga in the Eastern 
Highlands of 22 per cent in 1997, and 67 per cent in the more remote village of Misapi in 1998. 
Similar wide variations are found in the Tari valley, where males in the low flatlands had energy 
intakes of 3586 calories per day (cf. Gibson’s 2200 minimum per adult equivalent), whilst intakes of 
those in the hilly drylands were 2320 (Yamauchi 2000). Mutambek and Tumana (2000: 453) 
reported a high incidence of moderate to severe protein-energy malnutrition of children in Sandaun 
Province in the 1990s, but their figure of 28,500 children aged under 5 years presenting at health 
clinics with such malnutrition exceeds the total population of such children in the province (21,900 
in 1990). 
 
Chand (2004) also cited World Bank data on various social indicators that he uses to contrast Papua 
New Guinea’s performance unfavourably with that of some of its South Pacific peers. But the 
World Bank is not a primary source. Genuine primary sources are to be preferred, as noted by 
Sugden (2004, Table 1). Using published census data from 2000 and other primary sources 
(National Statistical Office 2003), Sugden reports an infant mortality rate of 64 per thousand births 
in 2000, considerably lower than Chand’s 79 per thousand births, not good but not quite so bad 
either -- and even that figure is difficult to square with Papua New Guinea’s claimed population 
growth rate of 2.66 per cent between 1980 and 2000 (but see corrections above).  
 
Chand’s Table 1 also cites data for GDP per capita of Papua New Guinea and its regional peers. 
Such comparative data are critically dependent on current exchange rates, and produce unreal 
results such as average income in the Solomon Islands being allegedly higher than in Papua New 
Guinea in the very year its government and economy virtually ceased to exist, leading to its de facto 
recolonisation in 2003 (by Australia).5 These comparisons are only meaningful if performed on a 
                                                     
5  In US dollar terms, Papua New Guinea’s GDP rose by 18.6 per cent in 2003 over 2002, but that was partly 
due to the 9 per cent appreciation in the average kina/US dollar exchange rate. The Solomons’ higher GDP 
per capita figure largely derived from its unrealistic exchange rate in 2002, and at its 2003 exchange rate its 
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purchasing power parity basis, and such data do not exist for the countries in question (other than 
dubious imputed, not data-based, estimates by the World Bank). 
 
How Rich Can and Should Papua New Guinea Be? 
Helen Hughes (2004: 1) proposes economic reforms that “could put Papua New Guinea on an 
annual growth path of 7 per cent a year that would double its GDP every decade”. That is certainly 
not an unreasonable ambition, since such rates have been and are being achieved by many countries 
in South-east Asia, including Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, not to mention China. Moreover, 
when Papua New Guinea’s total GDP growth rate, as measured in Australian dollars, has been 
nearly 6 per cent per annum since 1975 (as shown above), 7 per cent ought to be attainable. But the 
ambition seems unlikely to be attained if all of Hughes’ advice is followed, as she advises against 
relying on development both of mineral resources, such as the Gas-to-Queensland project, because 
such projects “create only economic rents that provide revenues for a swollen government and 
public services”, and renewable resources like timber, because of the “depredations of timber 
exporting companies” (ibid: 2-3). These are rather sweeping statements -- the government does 
manage to pay some 30,000 teachers, many of whom do teach rather than absent themselves (which 
is a problem in non-mission schools in many rural areas), and the “depredations” of timber 
exporters have been much exaggerated, as will be shown below. 
 
Hughes goes on to show how Papua New Guinea’s merchandise exports per capita, at US$324 in 
2002, are a small fraction of those of Botswana and Malaysia, yet in decrying the Somare 
government’s attempts to revive growth of mineral resource exports, ignores the fact that 
Botswana’s exports are dominated by diamonds with a much higher per capita value than Papua 
New Guinea’s total mineral exports, whilst Malaysia’s include a significant contribution from 
logging, which Hughes, like the World Bank, is wholly opposed to in Papua New Guinea. Although 
log and sawn timber exports are now less than 2 per cent of Malaysia’s total exports, they were ten 
times larger than Papua New Guinea’s in 2002. Moreover Malaysia’s total exports of logs, sawn 
timber, wood products, pulp and paper, rubber and products amounted to a staggering US$8.8 
billion in 2002, compared with just over US$200 million for Papua New Guinea (forty times less) -- 
but the World Bank and others advise Papua New Guinea against even contemplating development 
of its largest resource which could well rival Malaysia’s timber industry given half a chance. 
 
Helen Hughes also (2004: 1) endorses the conclusions of Satish Chand (2004), emphasizing the 
apparent zero growth of per capita income in 2003, and adding the claim that “[mineral] resource 
revenues have also led to waste and corruption, subsidising a small political elite at the expense of 
investment in roads, health, and education”. With many commentators following Chand in 
anticipating closure (because of reserve depletion) of all Papua New Guinea’s current mineral 
projects except Lihir Gold Ltd by 2012, Hughes looks to land tenure reform and massive expansion 
of the oil palm plantation sector as both the source of compensating export revenues and the 
drivers of her 7 per cent growth rate target, with her claim that oil palm exports could grow at 30 
per cent a year and replace oil and mining as the country’s biggest exports. 
 
Michael Bourke (2004) has demonstrated the improbability of this being feasible with the following 
data: 
 
The [average] FOB value of crude oil and minerals in 2001, 2002 and 2003 was K5155.4 million 
The [average] FOB price for palm oil for this period was K1095/tonne. Production of palm oil 
is about 3 tonnes per hectare of planted oil palm. PNG exports of palm oil in 2003 were 
                                                                                                                                                           
GDP per capita in US$ has declined to well below Papua New Guinea’s -- but again the only meaningful 
comparison would require data on relative prices. Dowrick and Quiggin (1994) have advised against use of 
constant price series of GDP for international comparisons of countries at a similar level of development, as 
“they may not be indicative of welfare rankings when relative prices vary”. 
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326,900 tonnes. Hence PNG would need to produce 4,700,000 tonnes of palm oil to totally 
replace crude oil and minerals [from over 1.5 million hectares compared with the present 
108,000 hectares]. 
If anything Bourke was too kind to Hughes -- his demolition would have been complete if he had 
noticed that her projected growth rate for Papua New Guinea’s oil palm exports would within 15 
years imply output greater than current world consumption -- and as a result a collapse in the world 
price. By then the area under oil palm would have to be over 7 million hectares -- another 
implausibility, as Bourke points out. 
 
Bourke’s evaluation is that there is not enough suitable land to permit the massive expansion of oil 
palm production needed to replace revenue from oil, gold, and copper. However, Kenya’s larger 
agricultural exports from a smaller area than is available in Papua New Guinea, including US$1 
billion in horticultural exports, despite a much larger population needing to be fed, suggests that 
there is scope for significant increases in palm oil and other agricultural production, if not to the 
extent needed to replace mineral revenues. But it would be necessary to go beyond the present mix 
of subsistence agriculture and smallholder cash crop production. 
 
Ironically, the primary industry that really could replace Papua New Guinea’s mineral exports if 
they dwindle almost to nil by 2015, as some (e.g. Hughes 2004) believe is likely, is that which 
already covers most of the country’s landmass -- namely its forests. Yet exports of forest products, 
mainly 2 million cubic metres of logs, already contributed K415.8 million (5.3 per cent) to total 
exports of K7.79 billion in 2003, compared with palm oil’s K421.3 million, despite the World Bank-
imposed export tax system (see below). Forest product exports would have been even smaller if the 
World Bank had succeeded in its demands that the government should close the Vailala and Wawoi 
Guavi projects (in Gulf and Western Provinces respectively) as part of its undeclared but obvious 
intention of terminating all logging in Papua New Guinea (Filer 2000, 2004). 
 
Meanwhile, Sweden, unimpeded by the World Bank, has been logging at rates of up to 70 million 
cubic metres a year for the last decade, 35 times more than Papua New Guinea with its much larger 
forested area (369,000 square kilometres compared with Sweden’s 244,000 square kilometres). 
Moreover, Sweden’s forestry industry adheres closely to its Standard for Forest Certification, and 
sets limits to the annual cut to ensure biodiversity and sustainability. Were Papua New Guinea to 
attain Sweden’s level of output, and there is no reason why it could not, given its equal -- possibly 
superior -- suitability for softwood pine forestry, then its logging exports could be worth K13 
billion, nearly double total exports in 2003, which would therefore much more than compensate for 
the projected decline in mineral exports after 2010.6
 
New Zealand is another country that owes much of its high standard of living to its development of 
its forestry resources, with annual production of 2.5 million cubic metres of sawn timber and 15.6 
million cubic metres of roundwood that was used in the production of 2 million tonnes of wood 
pulp and paper a year in the 1990s. Thus New Zealand’s loggers produced nearly ten times as much 
as Papua New Guinea’s in the 1990s, but from a forested area that is only seven per cent of the 
country’s smaller total land area. In 1993 26,750 persons were engaged in timber related industries -
- about three times more than in the whole of Papua New Guinea’s mining industry. New Zealand’s 
exports of forest products (excluding newsprint) contributed 10 per cent of its total exports in 
2002, and amounted to NZ$3.5 billion (about K6.6 billion, more than Papua New Guinea’s total 
exports in 2002).  
 
                                                     
6 Sweden’s total land area is 450,000 square kilometres, and its population is 9 million (July 2004). Sweden 
produced 17 million cubic metres of softwood lumber and 35 million cubic metres of softwood logs in 2003. 
Sweden also produced nearly 1 million cubic metres of temperate hardwood. 
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Interestingly, the share of natural forests in New Zealand’s production of roundwood dropped 
from 6 per cent in 1988 to one per cent by 1993, with plantations more than compensating, since 
total output increased by 50 per cent in that period. This is a natural progression that has hardly 
begun in Papua New Guinea, in part at least because of the difficulty in securing government 
approval and landowner participation in the required transition, as plantations with their long 
rotations require long-term leases if investors are to come forward and finance them.  
 
A recent New Zealand case study provides yet more evidence of Papua New Guinea’s failure to 
develop its forestry resources to their full potential. A plantation including the Kaingaroa Forest 
near Mount Maunganui acquired by Fletcher Challenge Forests in 2001 was projected to yield log 
sales of 4.5 million cubic metres of radiata pine and other species in 2004, and a further 0.8 million 
cubic metres of manufactured timber products -- all this from 162,173 hectares, or about 5 per cent 
of Papua New Guinea’s forested area. The log sales alone were projected to be worth NZ$427.5 
million, about A$388 million or K947 million, compared with Papua New Guinea’s total log 
exports worth K370 million in 2003 (Fletcher Challenge Forests 2002: 94-95). 
 
In another example from New Zealand, Fletcher Challenge Forests has been successful in both its 
owned and its leased plantations, and in 2000 earned US$88.8 million from sales of 1.48 million 
cubic metres of log sales grown on just its owned 110,000 hectares. If Papua New Guinea produced 
as much pro rata from only 5 million hectares of its total forest area of well over 30 million hectares, 
its log exports would be worth US$4 billion, or K13.5 billion, more than double its actual mineral 
exports in 2003.7
 
Even more pertinent, in terms of both opportunity and difficulty, is Fiji’s experience. Its total 
indigenous forest area is around 760,000 hectares (of which 200,000 hectares is production forest, 
with standing volumes of 30 cubic metres per hectare or more, 260,000 hectares non-commercial 
forest, and 300,000 hectares protection forest on steep slopes).  
 
Fiji has established comparatively large plantation forests. Around 45,000 hectares are under pine 
(managed by Fiji Pine Ltd), whereas about 50,000 hectares has been planted with broadleaf species 
such as mahogany (managed by Fiji Hardwood Ltd) (GTZ 2002). The Government of Fiji had 
begun planting pine on degraded grasslands in the 1950s, in an effort to rehabilitate the land and 
prevent further soil erosion. The areas planted are leased from local landowners. During the 1970’s, 
Fiji Pine carried out plantings on the two main islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. The long-term 
objective of this programme was to supply a timber-processing plant in Fiji to supply domestic and 
export markets. Simultaneously, small-scale plantings were being encouraged at village level in 
remote areas of the two main islands and the smaller more distant islands. These plantings were 
supported by the extension services of Fiji Pine Ltd., aiming to promote planting of pine on 
unproductive land and to maximise the returns from these plantations for the landowners.  
 
In the early 1980s, Fiji Pine Ltd set up Forest Development Service Ltd to administer the timber-
processing plant at Drasa (western Viti Levu), which would be responsible for processing timber 
from all large-scale plantations within a 100-mile radius. Small-scale plantings have reached maturity 
and are ready for harvesting. Unfortunately, they tend to be outside the 100-mile radius of the 
Drasa plant and, with the small volumes available, harvesting and processing are difficult and 
expensive. The former Fiji Pine Commission was corporatized in January 1991. Fiji Pine Ltd is now 
a public company wholly owned by Government and landowners, and headed by a Chief Executive 
who reports to a Board of Directors. There are two fundamental questions: whether it can be both 
financially viable and economically efficient. Although it has a modest operating profit, it has not 
                                                     
7 This calculation uses the price obtained by Fletcher Challenge’s log exports (mainly radiata pine) of US$60 
per cubic metre in 2000, compared with the average price (f.o.b.) of US$73 for Papua New Guinea’s exports 
of tropical hardwoods in 2000 (see Fletcher Challenge Forests 2000 and Bank of Papua New Guinea Quarterly 
Economic Bulletin, December 2003). 
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reached the point where is can meet operating costs, development expenditure and debt service 
obligations from internal revenues. If concessional finance is secured and if the Vanua Leva 
resource is developed (52,000 hectares of plantation) and exploited, the company will achieve its 
modest target financial rate of return of 3 per cent (DFID 2004). 
 
The above summary account of Fiji’s forestry -- based on reports by the aid agencies GTZ (2004) 
and DFID (2004) -- leaves out the political dimension in which efforts by an American 
entrepreneur, Marshall W. Pettit, in association with the Fijian businessman George Speight, to take 
over and amalgamate Fiji Pine and Fiji Hardwood led directly to the partially abortive coup attempt 
by Speight in 2000, after he had been blocked by the then prime minister from achieving his aims 
(Kahn 2000). Politics aside, the main economic problem appears to be the low level of profitability 
at Fiji Pine, which largely stems from low yields because of poor soils, extended droughts with 
associated fire hazards, and the small scale of operations, with only around 45,000 hectares of pine 
and mahogany respectively planted. The potential for much larger areas to be planted in Papua New 
Guinea, along with better soils and higher rainfall, would suggest that the Fijian model of direct 
landowner participation in ownership and management could be successfully transplanted.  
 
It has to be said that landowner problems could be as fraught in Papua New Guinea as in Fiji in 
2000. But while efforts by landowner companies in the former to involve themselves directly in 
extractive logging have all been failures, that was largely because such ventures were all based on 
logging the natural forest and did not contemplate plantation forestry. For example, Mullins (1994: 
44-72) has described how the Kumil timber project in Madang province failed despite the setting up 
of a landowner company (Ulingan Development Corporation, UDC, in which 74 clans had a total 
of 76 shares) to receive the government’s timber permit in 1984. UDC then engaged a succession of 
logging contractors who all failed to deliver on expected log harvest targets, mainly because of a 
combination of falling world prices, exacerbated by the strong kina policy (so that kina values of 
realised export values were less than the US dollar equivalent at the time), with the very low yields 
(at best only 36 cubic metres per hectare) and extremely mixed range of species in the Kumil area 
(Mullins 1994: 52-53). Leedom (1997) provides an account of similar failures of cooperation 
between landowners and the logging contractor at the Hawain logging project in East Sepik -- but 
again the low achieved yields (only 13 cubic metres per hectare) meant that the project’s cash 
returns disappointed all the stakeholders. By contrast, New Britain Palm Oil Ltd has successfully 
expanded its area of operations in partnership with local landowners, demonstrating that where 
there is potential profitability for all, landowner concerns need not be an obstacle. 
 
The potential for plantation forestry in Papua New Guinea will be evident from the yield data from 
the Silvicultural Manual for the Solomon Islands (Chaplin 1993). Planting logged areas at a rate of 
100,000 hectares a year, with a conservative rotation of 20 years, and logging old growth prior to 
planting to finance working capital, by 2025 it would be possible to harvest 100,000 hectares a year, 
which at an average yield of 250 cubic metres per hectare -- 7 times larger than at Kumil -- 
generates timber of 25 million cubic metres a year, worth US$2.5 billion at only $100 per cubic 
metre (as against the US$200 per cubic metre earned by Malaysia’s kwila exports in 2004 -- kwila 
being a species that is also widespread in Papua New Guinea). That exceeds the value of Papua 
New Guinea’s mineral exports in 2003, and would use only 3 million hectares of the 15-30 million 
potentially available for plantations.8
 
This demonstration that Papua New Guinea’s forest resource has the capacity to yield much more 
than the total income the country currently derives from mineral exports seems to be so politically 
incorrect that the income generating potential of plantation forestry could not be mentioned either 
in the World Bank’s loan appraisal (2000) or in the Ausaid/ANU Rural Development Handbook 
(Hanson et al. 2001). The latter hardly refers to forestry in any province, and not at all in Madang, 
                                                     
8 Sohngen et al. (1999) cite mean timber yields (annual increment rates in cubic metres per hectare per 
annum) of 17.4 in Oceania and 11.43 in Asia-Pacific in 1990; these imply rotations of between 15 years and 
22 years to achieve harvests of 250 cubic metres per hectare. 
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where the Gogol woodchip project eventually led to significant landowner participation in timber 
production for the Jant woodchip mill in Madang town. Yet the gross export value per hectare of 
forestry was as much as US$36,000 in 1997 (PNGFP 1998), and from coffee only US$1,642.9  But 
then authors of recent World Bank reports on agriculture and forestry in Papua New Guinea seem 
wholly unaware of the concept of yield that most Papua New Guinean subsistence farmers 
appreciate rather well.10 Even the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (2004) recognises that its 
klinkii pine plantation at Bulolo has yields at least ten times larger than those of most natural forest 
logging operations, at around 250 cubic metres per hectare against, for example, the 26 cubic 
metres that was hoped for by the Rimbunan Hijau logging project at Hawain in East Sepik, where 
its actual yield in 1993-94 was only 13 cubic metres per hectare (Leedom 1997: 63). Yet the Forest 
Authority has made no attempt either to replicate the Bulolo plantation elsewhere on its own 
account or to encourage a shift to plantation silviculture by the resource owners themselves. 
 
Not one of the many fine full-colour maps of each province’s subsistence agriculture and land 
potential in the Rural Development Handbook shows either the topography or the extent of forested 
areas. Both are surely critical for assessing the scope for yet more subsistence agriculture, and 
especially for determining the trade-offs between forestry activities and agriculture when both 
compete for the same land. Hopefully, a future second edition would address this by collating the 
forestry location maps from the National Forest Plan 1996 with the maps in the Handbook. 
Comparing the maps for Sandaun Province (see Figures 4 and 5), one may note how the potential 
for forestry just inland from the coast east of Aitape would not compete with the main agriculture 
in the province, which is low intensity sago production in the most populous area around Lumi, 
south of Aitape. The Handbook fails to mention either the poor quality of subsistence based on sago 
or the potential of plantation forestry to generate employment and high cash income per hectare, 
despite concluding that the people of Sandaun have “very low incomes, poor access to services 
[and] have few opportunities to improve their livelihoods” (Hanson et al. 2001: 229). 
 
The neglect of forestry in the Rural Development Handbook, with its focus on smallholder agriculture, 
is less surprising than the absence of any specific measures to raise incomes from forestry either in 
the World Bank’s proposal in 2000 to offer a Forestry and Conservation Loan Agreement to Papua 
New Guinea of US$17 million or in the (2004) report of its Forestry Review Team to the 
government’s Inter-Agency Forestry Committee. The World Bank’s Project Appraisal claimed that 
the loan would generate financial and economic rates of return of 21 per cent per annum. That 
seems unlikely when its main components consist of allocating US$6.4 million to improving 
landowner decision-making through training workshops and seminars, and US$4.68 million for 
“technical assistance” to the government’s Office for Environment and Conservation. A further 
US$7.26 million of the project loan will fund the Forest Authority to expand its “inspection and 
monitoring” (World Bank code for prevention, see Filer 2004) of forest operations (World Bank 
2000: 36-40). Given that the proposed loan requires payment with interest at the World Bank’s 
usual commercial fixed spread rate, commitment fees (0.85 per cent per annum for the first 4 
years), and front-end fee (1 per cent or US$0.1736 million), the Government of Papua New Guinea 
has done well not to proceed with this project, with its highly unlikely capacity to generate sufficient 
tax revenue to enable the government to repay the full loan which with interest could well be 
US$35 million. We suggest below that the Government should request the World Bank to consider 
revising the project so as to provide seed funding for establishment of at least five plantations, since 
                                                     
9 Equivalent figures for 2003 are US$13,950 for timber and US$520 for coffee. 
10 For example, the World Bank’s (1997) report on ‘accelerating agricultural growth’ in Papua New Guinea 
never discusses yields of alternative crops either relative to each other or to plantation forestry. Likewise, the 
earlier World Bank report on the forestry sector also fails to compare the opportunity costs of plantation 
forestry with those of agriculture in a country whose primary resource endowment is forests whilst 
downplaying the prospects for the former (World Bank 1990: 26) and ignoring them completely in its section 
on “maximizing returns to the forestry sector” (ibid: 29). 
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there would be some prospect of these generating tax revenues (from both the profits of the 
plantation companies and the incomes of their employees). Fletcher Challenge Forests provided for 
taxes of US$15 million in 2000, but the Bank’s loan appraisal never mentions any tax being 
generated by its project for the good reason that there could be none -- least of all from the advisers 
it was proposing to fund from the loan’s technical assistance component (US$7.37 million). 
 
Colin Filer (2000) has documented the repeated efforts of the Papua New Guinea government to 
engineer replacement of log exports by processed timber products, as urged by the Barnett Inquiry. 
Lacking that theology, New Zealand’s Fletcher Challenge Forests sold 3.5 million cubic metres of 
logs in 2000, and only 0.6 million cubic metres of manufactured products, directing more than half 
of its logs to processors in Japan, Korea, and other industrial countries, while less than half was 
taken up by industry in New Zealand. In general, it is difficult for exporters of raw materials to 
know in detail the specific requirements of consumers in importing countries for the finished 
product, which presumably explains why New Zealand’s exporters have been content to export raw 
rather than finished products.  
 
The New Zealand data possibly provide a measure of by how much the World Bank should offer 
to compensate Papua New Guinea, annually, for its proposed cessation of all logging. A more 
constructive approach would be for the World Bank to recognize that the New Zealand model has 
much more to offer all participants than its own preference for a complete ban on logging. The 
Kaingaroa forest largely comprises Crown (i.e. State) land but with options that could allow it to 
revert wholly or partly to Maori ownership, subject to conditions allowing the licensee (then 
Fletcher Challenge) to complete all the existing rotation and harvesting of all the crop of that 
rotation (Fletcher Challenge Forests 2000: 67). By contrast, most forest licences issued in Papua 
New Guinea have no certainty, being either terminable at will by the Government whenever it has 
been required to do so by the World Bank or subject to penal export tax rates also imposed by the 
World Bank in its 1996 Structural Adjustment Programme -- and for that reason there has been 
little incentive for licensees either to undertake sustainable logging of natural forest or to replant on 
a plantation basis (Filer 1998: 367-8). 
 
Now if Papua New Guinea chose to follow the example of countries like Malaysia, Sweden, and 
New Zealand by exploiting its largest resource to its full potential, what would need to be done to 
begin that process? The first step would have to be repealing the 1991 Forestry Act, and reverting 
substantially to the legislation previously in place, notably the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act. The 
1991 Act grew out of what in retrospect seems the half-baked Barnett Report, with its exhaustive -- 
not to say exhausting -- exposure of alleged depredations by foreign logging companies. On closer 
inspection, much of Barnett’s evidence of transfer pricing was false, mainly because he failed (apart 
from a cursory mention) to allow for freight costs when comparing c.i.f. log import prices in Japan 
with f.o.b. export prices in Papua New Guinea. Malaysian and Papua New Guinean log export 
prices tracked each other very closely in the 1980s and showed the same difference from Japan’s 
import prices (see Figure 3).11
 
Ironically, real evidence of transfer pricing emerged after the World Bank required Papua New 
Guinea to impose a progressive export tax in 1997, resulting in sharp reductions in both volumes 
and declared prices as compared with Malaysia’s at the same time. The effective marginal rate of the 
log export tax is easily as much as 110 per cent of normal profits, for a normal gross profit margin 
on sales value of K100 per cubic metre could be 30 per cent, but the log tax rises to 30 per cent of 
marginal sales value when prices rise are between K110 and K130 per cubic metre, 50 per cent 
between K130 and K150, and finally 70 per cent on the excess of prices above K200 (as of 2000; 
                                                     
11  Duncan (1994: 20) also concluded there was very little evidence to support Barnett’s claims of either 
transfer pricing or under-reporting of volumes exported prior to 1994. 
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there have been slight adjustments since then).12 That explains why declared log prices have fallen 
since the Bank’s tax came in from as much as $170 per cubic metre in 1996 to as low as US$70, 
with a consequent loss of foreign exchange earnings as well as tax proceeds far below what they 
would be in a more honest system, based on corporate tax at PNG’s current rate of 25 per cent for 
non-mining profits.13  
The export tax system imposed by the World Bank is a levy that is more than proportionate with 
rising prices of log exports above a very low level. Now all economics tells us that: 
 
1. Sales taxes like GST should be levied at a flat percentage rate, as with the 10 per cent GST 
in Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
2. Export taxes are not very clever, given that most countries seek to encourage exports.  
 
Indeed, most GST systems exempt exports entirely, by providing for refunds of GST paid on 
exporters’ inputs. The World Bank (1999a: 67) recognized this, but excused its progressive export 
tax on the grounds that the country’s Internal Revenue Commission (IRC) was not capable of 
collecting corporate taxes from the log exporters. A simpler solution to that problem would have 
been to use the US$1 million the Bank spends on consultants in the Forest Authority to provide the 
same number of tax auditors to the IRC. Even just one would be enough to see to it that Rimbunan 
Hijau paid its due taxes on its 60-80 per cent share of total log exports.  
 
The World Bank’s reaction (1999a: 66-67) was both cynical and dishonest -- it claimed that the fall 
in log exports in 1998 and 1999 was not due to its tax but to the regional economic crisis of 1997-
98. But Malaysia’s strong forest product exports in those years give the lie to the World Bank’s 
assertion.  
 
Some authors, including both Duncan (1994) and the World Bank (2000), justify penal log export 
tax rates as the means whereby the Papua New Guinea Government can capture “resource rents” 
whenever prices rise above prescribed levels. Ironically, the same authors and many others decry 
rent-seeking behaviour by Papua New Guineans, especially putative landowners in the mineral 
project areas. Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983) proposed progressive mineral taxation (known as 
the “additional profits tax” with rates rising to 75 per cent for petroleum projects) for the same 
reasons and secured its adoption in Papua New Guinea, albeit in a modified form which means that 
it has seldom been operative. Mainstream economics deplores all rent-seeking and sees the perfectly 
competitive model as the means whereby it can and should be eliminated, since optimal levels of 
production will not be attained while rents persist. Mainstream economics proposes, instead of 
rent-seeking taxation, use of lumpsum transfers from rich to poor to secure desired income 
redistribution, since such transfers do not affect production levels. Papua New Guinea’s standard 
                                                     
12 Fletcher Challenge Forests’ revenues were only 6 per cent and 13 per cent larger than operating costs in 
1999 and 2000 respectively.  Had it been subjected to even the World Bank’s lowest 15 per cent tax rate on its 
exports it could have been put out of business (Fletcher Challenge Forests 2000: 27). 
13 It has been claimed (by Jim Douglas amongst others) that the World Bank’s initial forest revenue system 
might not have had the severe impact on declared export volumes and prices after 1997 had it been imposed 
as originally intended on US dollar export prices rather than the Kina equivalent price applied by the Papua 
New Guinea Forest Authority and Customs, especially when the Kina was depreciating rapidly (see Table 3). 
However, it is likely that higher rates would have been charged if the US dollar price had been the applicable 
base following the fall in international prices in 1998 -- using the declared log prices below US$100 since 1998 
as the tax base, the Bank’s progressive tax rates would have generated zero revenue. That is why, when the 
tax base was changed to US dollars in the 2004 Budget, the nominal rates were drastically changed to match 
the lower US dollar prices (compare Tables 3 and 4). 
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corporate tax system is consistent with this approach, with a flat rate of 35 per cent on foreign 
mining companies’ profits even though it secures only a proportionately high revenue yield when 
profits are high.14 The underlying naiveties in the Garnaut and Clunies Ross case for additional 
profits taxation are, first, that it is inimical to profit maximization (attainable only with flat rate 
corporate taxes) because of its progressive character, and second, their failure to appreciate that 
since public companies sooner or later distribute profits to their shareholders, it is taxation of the 
latter that may be used to achieve social objectives. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown the enormous potential of Papua New Guinea’s forest industry for 
generation of vastly higher incomes for a high proportion of the country’s population. Within a 
seminar paper’s confines of time and space it has not been possible to include a discussion of how 
land tenure issues might complicate the development of plantation forestry in Papua New Guinea, 
but these are taken up in Curtin (2003) and Curtin and Lea (n.d.). Fingleton (2004) argues that 
Papua New Guinea cannot be viable without customary land groups, while Hughes argues that it 
cannot be viable while full property rights are denied to agricultural producers (see Gosarevski et al. 
2004). Both are probably wrong: the expansion of oil palm planting in areas not owned but directly 
managed by New Britain Palm Oil Ltd shows that individual land titling is not a necessary condition 
for commercial large scale production, whilst clearly the existence of thousands of incorporated 
land groups has done little for production in most of the country. New Britain Palm Oil’s leasing 
arrangements could well serve as a model for plantation forestry.15
 
The production and other data cited above from New Zealand and Solomon Islands showed how it 
is feasible for Papua New Guinea to generate exports from plantation forestry to a value double its 
present total exports. Doubling exports would of itself generate at least a proportionate increase in 
national income and GDP and thereby a doubling of average incomes from the present (2003) 
US$673-760 (depending on actual population) or A$1035-1169 to about US$1400 or A$2200 
(discounting growth from any other source). That could be achieved within 10-15 years if 
plantations were developed on the rotation basis that the World Bank’s first forestry report (1990: 
24) considered feasible. Ironically, given the World Bank’s later hostility, that would also allow 
Papua New Guinea to achieve most of the “Millennium Development Goals”, such as reductions 
in the 1990 levels of infant mortality by two-thirds and attainment of universal primary education. 
 
To achieve such an outstanding result would require the following actions: 
 
1. Repeal of the restrictions in the Forestry Act 1991 on customary landowners’ ability to 
negotiate timber sales agreements, and replacement of the Act by new legislation to 
provide for (i) enabling provisions for landowners to enter into long term leasing 
arrangements including to their own wholly or partly owned plantation companies, (ii) 
public auctioning of timber rights exclusively to public companies registered in Papua New 
Guinea and listed on the Port Moresby Stock Exchange, with special voting rights for 
                                                     
14 Mining company taxation in Papua New Guinea comprises a profits tax of 35 per cent and a dividend 
withholding tax for non-residents of 17 per cent, for an all-in rate of 46 per cent, on which foreign 
shareholders will usually be able to claim tax credits in their home countries. The structure is different for 
petroleum and for new mining projects post-2000. 
15 This author’s paternal and maternal ancestors have for over 500 years been tenants of first the abbots of 
Glastonbury (in Somerset, England) and then since 1539 of the royal and secular expropriators of the abbots. 
With secure long-term tenancy agreements they have not been deterred from successful farming until the 
present. Neither Fingleton nor Hughes seems to be aware of the concept of tenancy. 
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landowners as “Class A” shareholders being a possibility, and (iii) public auctioning of logs 
offered for sale to exporters by the public companies in (ii).16 
2. Amendment of the Land Groups Incorporation Act to provide for re-registration of those 
Incorporated Land Groups Act with a prescribed minimum level of fully paid-up capital as 
public companies under the Corporations Act. 
3. Cancellation of all log export taxes, and increased staffing of the Internal Revenue 
Commission to undertake annual tax audits of all firms engaged in the forest industry in 
order to secure compliance with the Taxation Act. 
4. Requisition to the World Bank to redesign its proposed Forestry and Conservation Project 
loan of US$17 million to contribute to the startup costs of say five commercial forestry 
plantation projects and the establishment costs of arboreta in areas of exceptional 
biodiversity. 
 
                                                     
16 Duncan (1994) made a similar proposal. 
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Appendix 
Reconciliation of Papua New Guinea’s 1980 and 2000 Population 
Censuses 
The 1980 Census is generally considered to be the most reliable of the three censuses since Papua 
New Guinea became independent in 1975. The 1990 census was of a generally high standard, but 
inter-censal comparisons between 1980 and 1990 are complicated by the absence of data from the 
North Solomons province (Bougainville) because of its attempted secession in 1989. This led to the 
return to the rest of Papua New Guinea of many migrant workers from cocoa plantations and the 
Panguna copper mine as well as many Bougainvilleans, especially public servants, resulting in some 
inflation of the 1990 population in the other 18 provinces and the National Capital District. Hayes 
shows how the population in 1990 aged 10-19 was recorded as larger than that aged 0-9 in Papua 
New Guinea (minus Bougainville) in 1980, and that there was a generally lower than normal level of 
attrition between other 1980 age-groups and their counterparts in 1990 (Hayes 1996, Table 2.3 and 
p.20). That is an indication of net migration from Bougainville to the rest of Papua New Guinea in 
1989. This suggests that one needs to use the 1980 census as the benchmark for deriving a 
corrected population of Papua New Guinea in 2000, using (unlike Hayes) the total population in 
1980, as by 2000 Bougainville had returned to the fold (at least for the census in most districts). 
 
In Figure 1, the evident over-enumeration of the 2000 census is depicted by comparing age-groups 
in 1980 with their counterparts 20 years older in 2000. In Figure 2, the 2000 population is restated 
using the E0=40 UN Far East model’s table of survival ratios (see Hayes 1996, Table 3.1).17  
However while use of life tables enables us to estimate the survivors from each 5-year cohort alive 
in 1980 still alive in 2000, it does not provide guidance on numbers aged 0-9 in 1990 and 2000 
respectively. Raising numbers aged 0-9 in 1990 for all Papua New Guinea by 5 per cent to allow for 
children born in Bougainville between 1980 and 1990, and using the enumerated numbers in that 
age-group in 2000 produces a population of only 4.5 million in 2000, rather than the claimed 5.17 
million, but one that is at least consistent for all those aged more than 19 in 2000 with the numbers 
aged 0-9 in 1980. The implied population growth rate between 1999 and 2000 is then 2.15 per cent 
per annum, and that seems more consistent with Papua New Guinea’s relatively high infant 
mortality rate than the supposed 2.66 per cent growth rate indicated by the unadjusted 2000 
Census. 
 
                                                     
17 Hayes (1996) contains only the female survival ratios, so the corrected 2000 Census is 
subject to further adjustment. The E0=40 survival ratios were selected because they 
imply a somewhat smaller population for Papua New Guinea (minus Bougainville) in 
1990 than was enumerated, by 35,000, thereby roughly allowing for the net migration 
from Bougainville to the rest of Papua New Guinea in 1989. 
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Chart 1 Papua New Guinea's GDP at current prices
 in Kina, A$, and US$
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Table  1
GDP growth in Papua New Guinea and Australia 1975-2003
1. Papua New Guinea 1974/75 2003 1975-2003
% pa
1.1 National Income (GDP), current prices, K Mn. 1004.10 12,947.50     9.13
1.21 Population, million 2.68 5.41 2.51
1.22 Population, 2003 adjusted 2.68 4.79 2.08
1.31 GDP per head, Kina, official 2003 population 374.31 2,393.25       6.63
1.32 GDP per head, Kina, adjusted 2003 population 374.31 2,701.59       7.06
1.41 GDP per head, A$, official 2003 population 374.31 1,035.32       3.63
1.42 GDP per head, A$, adjusted 2003 population 374.31 1,168.71       4.07
1.51 GDP per head, US$, official 2003 population 470.55 673.94          1.28
1.52 GDP per head, US$, adjusted 2003 population 470.55 760.77          1.72
1.61 GDP, current prices, A$ 1004.10 5,601.09       6.14
1.62 GDP, current prices, US$ 1262.25 3,646.02       3.79
2. Australia
2.1 GDP, A$, current prices 67,105.00   193,184.00   3.78
2.2GDP per capita, A$ 4,970.74     9,706.00       2.39
Sources: Bank of Papua New Guinea 1998; Treasury, Budget 2005; author for adjusted 2003 population
Australian Bureau of Statistics 5206, National Income, Expenditure and Product , June 2004; 
ABS Australia  Yearbook 2001
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea 1998, 2003 
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Table  2
Scaled poverty line food baskets, national average quantities
Kcal
Ave grams Ave kg Kcal Edible per AE p.d.
per AE per day per AE per year per kg fraction (edible portions)
 
Sweet Potato
Cassava
Taro
Yam
Banana
Sago
Coconut
Pork
Chicken
Fish
Sugar cane
Other fresh fruit
Peanut
Aibika
Other veg. & nuts
Potato
Betel nut
Eggs
665 242.73               1144 0.84 639.04                  
70 25.55                 1295 0.87 78.87                    
183 66.80                 1117 0.84 171.71                  
58 21.17                 1140 0.81 53.56                    
302 110.23               1165 0.65 228.69                  
119 43.44                 3313 1 394.25                  
103 37.60                 3837 0.65 256.89                  
Rice 23 8.40                   3830 1 88.09                    
Lamb & mutton 1 0.37                   3780 0.84 3.18                      
7 2.56                   3290 0.84 19.35                    
1 0.37                   2040 0.72 1.47                      
Other meat 13 4.75                   2480 0.99 31.92                    
5 1.83                   1398 0.74 5.17                      
131 47.82                 678 1 88.82                    
24 8.76                   433 0.83 8.63                      
1 0.37                   5516 0.69 3.81                      
38 13.87                 350 0.5 6.65                      
157 57.31                 521 0.74 60.53                    
1 0.37                   750 0.8 0.60                      
17 6.21                   1100 0.4 7.48                      
Flour 2 0.73                   3433 1 6.87                      
Tinned meat 1 0.37                   1921 1 1.92                      
Tinned fish 2 0.73                   1820 1 3.64                      
Milk 0 -                     4924 1 -                       
Sugar 2 0.73                   3935 1 7.87                      
Bread 1 0.37                   2370 1 2.37                      
Biscuits 1 0.37                   3674 1 3.67                      
Dripping 1 0.37                   8741 1 8.74                      
0 -                     2374 0.96 -                       
Tea etc 0 -                     484 1 -                       
Snack food 0 -                     5026 1 -                       
Salt, spices, sauces 1 0.37                   205 1 0.21                      
Soft drink 1 0.37                   466 1 0.47                      
Beer 0 -                     347 1 -                       
Other alcohol 0 -                     1929 1 -                       
Meals out 29.00                    
Totals 1931 2,213.42               
Source: Gibson and Rozelle 1998 Table 1, p.49 (items in red are locally produced; items in blue are 
either imported or produced from imported materials). 
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Table  3
Log export tax regimes in Papua New Guinea 1995-1999
(Kina log price as tax base)
1995 1997 1999
1. Prices, K/m3,  fob K/m3 K/m3 K/m3
 @ fob price US$100/m3 132.54 143.45 285.71
 @ fob price US$200/m3 265.08 286.90 571.43
2. Tax payable, levied on Kina prices K/m3 K/m3 K/m3
 @ fob price US$100/m3 41.35 36.90 130.5
 @ fob price US$200/m3 82.70 131.33 330.5
3. Net after tax export Value K/m3 K/m3 K/m3
 @ fob price US$100/m3 91.19 106.55 155.21
 @ fob price US$200/m3 182.37 155.57 240.93
4. Net after tax export Value in US$ US$/m3 US$/m3 US$/m3
 @ fob price US$100/m3 68.80 74.28 54.33
 @ fob price US$200/m3 137.60 108.45 84.33
5. Tax payable, levied on US$ price, payable in kina
K/m3 K/m3 K/m3
 @ fob price US$100/m3 41.35 23.67 47.14
 @ fob price US$200/m3 82.70 101.13 201.43
6. Exchange Rate, US$/Kina 0.7545 0.6971 0.35
Sources: Filer 1997, p.231; Hunt 2001, p.43
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Table  4
Log export tax regime 2004
(US$ fob export price tax base)
Bottom Top of Marginal Amount Eff rate
of bracket bracket Rate/m3 US$ %
0.00 22.60 0.10 2.15 9.50
22.60 27.60 0.24 3.34 12.08
27.60 32.63 0.43 5.49 16.82
32.63 37.65 0.48 7.87 20.91
37.65 50.20 0.52 14.43 28.74
50.20 100.00 0.62 45.08 45.08
100.00 150.00 0.62 75.91 50.60
150.00 200.00 0.62 106.73 53.37
Source: Treasury, 2004 Budget
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Fig. 1 Population by age-group in 1980
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Fig.2 Census 1980 and Censuses 1990 and 2000 as adjusted by Life Tables
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Fig.3
Japan's log import prices (cif) and export prices (fob) of Malaysia & Papua New Guinea
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Fig.4 Sandaun Province - Subsistence agriculture
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Fig.5 Sandaun Province - Forest Resource Map 
 
 
